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Abstract: Combine two games of incomplete information, one after the
other, for which their equilibria are established through very different meth-
ods; will the resulting composite game have an equilibrium? Let Γ be the set
of probability distributions on the pathways of play of the first game and for
every subset C that can be held in common knowledge at the conclusion of
the first game and γ ∈ Γ let γ|C be the conditional probability distribution
on C, given that it is well defined. If the first game has a finite game tree
with perfect recall and for every such C the second game has an equilibrium
payoff correspondence which, as a function of γ|C, is upper-semi-continuous
and has non-empty, convex and compact values, then the answer is yes. To
prove this, the concept of a myopic equilibrium is introduced, an alternative
equilibrium concept to that of the Nash equilibrium. In spite of the differ-
ence, there is a strong relationship between the two equilibrium concepts in
the context of incomplete information and repetition.
Key words: Repeated games and game trees, topological structure of equi-
libria, fixed points, the nearest point retraction onto a simplex
1 Introduction
The following game inspired this work. Nature chooses a state k from a
finite set K according to some probability distribution p0 ∈ ∆(K). There
are two players, Player One and Player Two. Player One, but not Player
Two, is informed of nature’s choice. The players choose actions simultane-
ously which are commonly observable directly after those choices, and this
situation is repeated an infinite number of times, but with nature’s choice of
k fixed from the start. The payoffs to both player are determined both by
what the two players do and by nature’s choice. If the payoffs to the play-
ers are determined by the limit behaviour of the average payoffs, a infinitely
repeated undiscounted game of incomplete information on one side has been
described in Aumann and Maschler (1995), and the existence of their equilib-
ria was established in Simon, Spiez˙, and Torun´czyk (1995). We introduce the
following game variation. For both players i = 1, 2 there are finitely many
non-negative values λi1, λ
i
2, . . . , λ
i
n with 0 < λ
i
1 + · · · + λ
i
n = λ
i < 1 so that
for Player i the jth stage is weighted according to λij and the undiscounted
infinitely repeated game is weighted according to 1 − λi. Does such a game
have a Nash equilibrium?
The above question was posed to us by A. Neyman (private communication,
2016), and our initial response to his question was “ definitively not!” The
proof of equilibrium existence for a game with a finite tree structure and
perfect recall uses fixed point theory, through the original proof of Nash
equilibria in Nash (1950) and the application of Kuhn’s Theorem (1953).
However the proof of equilibrium existence for the undiscounted infinitely
repeated game uses a covering theorem that has similarity with the Borsuk-
Ulam Theorem (and yet neither implies nor is implied by the Borsuk-Ulam
Theorem). Why should there be a synthesis of these two very different proofs?
We answer A. Neyman’s question in the affirmative. We make no synthesis
of the two proofs, rather we apply properties of the equilibria of the infinitely
repeated games to the finite stage game. To answer this question we introduce
a new equilibrium concept, called a myopic equilibrium.
What is the main problem with understanding the strategic aspects of finitely
many initial stages followed by an infinite stage game? Lets simplify the
problem, so that λ11 = λ
2
1 = λ =
1
3
, meaning that the first stage counts for
1
3
of the payoff and all the remaining infinitely many stages count for 2
3
of
the payoff. As Player Two knows nothing but p0 about the state of nature
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on the first stage, he must choose some state independent mixed strategy
τ . As different states could have very different payoff structures, one would
expect large initial payoff advantages for Player One through actions that
are dependent on the states of nature. But by doing so, Player One could
reveal too much about the state, as 2
3
of the payoff comes from the following
stages. Both using her information too much and not at all seem to be foolish
options for Player One. There is a delicate give and take between the initial
choices of Player One at the different states and the conditional probabilities
on the states that these choices induce.
By a pure strategy of Player One on the first stage we mean a determination
of an initial action dependent on the state of nature, so that if I is her set of
actions then there are |I||K| different pure strategies for the first stage. By a
mixed strategy of Player One on the first stage we mean a probability distri-
bution over those pure strategies. Lets assume that there is a subset of the
equilibrium payoffs of the infinitely repeated game that change continuously
with the conditional probability distribution on the states of nature. Keeping
with the idea that λ = λi1 for both i = 1, 2, we could define a game where on
the first stage Player One chooses a mixed strategy for herself, Player Two
chooses a mixed strategy for himself (necessarily state independent), followed
by a payoff determined by the initial stage and an equilibrium payoff asso-
ciated with the induced conditional probability on the states of nature. For
any fixed mixed strategy of Player Two, the payoff for Player One will not
in general be concave as a function of her mixed strategies. As there are
many games that don’t have any equilibrium when a payoff function is not
concave relative to the actions of the player concerned (see later example),
we anticipated that the composite game of Neyman’s question would fail to
have an equilibrium.
On closer examination, we discovered that replacing a mixed strategy of
Player One with another mixed strategy of the same player was not the
correct model of strategic deviation for these games. Assume that Player
One is committed to some mixed strategy on the first stage for which every
action is played with large positive probability at some state of nature. No
matter what Player One does on that first stage there is no appearance of a
strategic deviation. Unless Player One demonstrates an action that should
never have happened, Player Two will continue to interpret the future actions
of Player One according to a putative commitment to that mixed strategy,
and not to a different strategy that Player One might have chosen. For there
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to be an equilibrium it is necessary that any advantage from one action is
properly offset by a subsequent disadvantage on the following stages, and
that this holds simultaneously for all states of nature. We will see that the
required equilibrium property leads directly to the definition of a myopic
equilibrium.
The myopic equilibrium concept was formulated to solve Neyman’s problem,
as explained above. Its main application in this paper is however broader,
to game trees where information is incomplete. It is intriguing that in order
to prove that a certain game has a Nash equilibrium, it was necessary to
formulate a new equilibrium concept that can differ greatly from the Nash
equilibrium concept. That intrigue is accentuated by our desire to present
the concept abstractly and independently. We do so because we don’t know
in what other contexts the myopic equilibrium concept can be applied.
To bring into focus the relationship between the myopic and Nash equilibria,
consider a three person game with simultaneous actions. Let I be the finite
set of Player One’s actions. One way to analyse this game is to define for ev-
ery distribution p ∈ ∆(I) a game Γ(p) played by the second and third players
based on their assumption that p is the distribution by which the first player
has acted. For every such p ∈ ∆(I), there will be a set of equilibrium strate-
gies for the second and third players, and with them corresponding payoffs
for all three players in the game Γ(p). If we return to the possible choices of
the first player, represented by the set ∆(I), we recognise a correspondence
of payoffs for Player One, determined by the p ∈ ∆(I) and the induced equi-
libria of the other two players. We can reformulate this as a one-player game
with Player One as the only player. As a function of p, the corresponding
payoffs for the first player will not be affine; in general they will define a
correspondence. We could view this game as an optimisation problem – the
natural solution would be that the first player should choose the p with the
largest corresponding payoff. With this approach, given a functional selec-
tion of payoffs defined on the p ∈ ∆(I), one could see this optimisation as
a kind of Nash equilibrium of a one player game. But this optimisation ap-
proach would in general have no relationship to the Nash equilibrium of the
original three player game! In a Nash equilibrium of a standard game de-
fined by multi-linear functions, each action chosen with positive probability
should share a common maximal payoff among all the actions that can be
taken. But that in general will fail for the p ∈ ∆(I) that optimise the payoff
for Player One in this one-player game; the different actions given positive
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probability could result in very different payoffs (and also could be dwarfed
by the payoff from an action given zero probability). Rather the solution
concept for the one-player game directly relevant to the Nash equilibria of
the original three player game is that of the myopic equilibria.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we introduce
the formal concept of myopic equilibria and prove its existence when the
payoffs are continuous as functions of the strategy spaces. In the third section
we define a truncated game tree and prove that all composite games from
truncated game trees with certain structures have equilibria. In the fourth
section we answer the question of A. Neyman and speculate on closely related
applications. In the fifth and last section, we look at examples and a possible
future direction of research.
2 Myopic equilibria
Nash equilibria are understood in terms of strategies that are best replies
to themselves. A best reply is a strategy of a player that can replace that
player’s existing strategy and maximise the payoff for that player. Usually
one assumes that the set of strategies of a player is a compact and convex set
and that, given fixed strategies of the other players, the payoff to that player
is affine in its set of strategies. If one assumes that the payoff function is
concave in that player’s strategies, the mathematics is similar, since optimal
responses (existent from the compactness of the strategy set) are realised on
a convex subset. If the payoff function to a player is only continuous with
respect to his or her strategies, one would not expect there to be a Nash
equilibrium, which can demonstrated with simple examples.
The idea that a strategy space is compact and convex comes initially from
the assumption that it is the convex span of a finite set of actions. In this
paper, we keep this assumption, though our definition of myopic equilibria
could be generalised to a compact set of actions using support sets.
Definition. Let N be a finite set of players, and for each n ∈ N let In be a
finite set of actions. Let ∆ =
∏
n∈N ∆(In) be the strategy space for all the
players. We say that x ∈ ∆ is a myopic equilibrium for a family of (payoff)
functions {wni : ∆ → R | n ∈ N, i ∈ In} if for all n ∈ N and i ∈ In with
xni 6= 0 one has w
n
i (x) = maxj∈In w
n
j (x).
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Convention. Above and further, given y ∈
∏
n∈N R
In we denote by yn the
image of y of under the natural projection onto RIn , and by yni the i–th
coordinate of yn, for i ∈ In. With the function w : ∆→
∏
n∈N R
In satisfying
wni (x) = (w(x))
n
i , for all x ∈ ∆, n ∈ N and i ∈ In, we also say that x is a
myopic equilibrium ”for w”, instead of ”for {wni | n ∈ N, i ∈ In}”.
How does the myopic equilibrium concept compare with the conventional
way to define a game and the conventional Nash equilibrium concept?
With the myopic equilibrium concept there are |In| different payoffs for Player
n, one for each of this player’s actions, and they are functions on the strategy
space ∆. From these payoffs, one can define a functions gn from ∆ to R
for each player n in the canonical way, by gn(x) :=
∑
i∈In
xni w
n
i (x). Such
functions are not necessarily affine or concave in the strategies of a player.
Starting with such functions gn, there will always be at least one way to define
corresponding functions wni for the i ∈ In that so induce the g
n as above,
namely to define wni (x) to be g
n(x) for every i ∈ In. By defining the w
n
i in
this way every point in ∆ is a myopic equilibrium, and that is not interesting.
The interest in myopic equilibria lies entirely with how the payoffs are defined
for the individual actions. One must guarantee minimally that whenever x
calls for Player n to choose an action j ∈ In with certainty it follows that
wnj (x) must equal g
n(x), but beyond that there will be many ways to define
the wnj . If the payoffs for all players are multilinear functions, one could say
also that there are |In| different payoffs for each player n, defined however
on the smaller set {i}×
∏
j∈N\{n}∆(Ij) for each choice i ∈ In of action in In.
In this special case, a myopic equilibrium is the same as a Nash equilibrium.
But when the payoffs to a player are not so defined, the two equilibrium
concepts can differ greatly, as we see in examples in §5.
There is a concept of local equilibrium, a member x of ∆ such that for every
n the strategy xn of player n defines a local maximum of this player’s payoff
function. See Biasi and Monis (2013) for such an alternative concept in
the context of differentiable payoff functions. However this concept of local
equilibrium is still based on functions gn defined on ∆, without necessarily
separate functions wni defined for each action, as described above. We will see
later from an example that local and myopic equilibria can be very different.
We postpone until later discussing examples of myopic equilibria and pass
to establishing some of their properties. We show first that the myopic equi-
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librium concept is amenable to a version the Structure Theorem of Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986).
Theorem 1. LetW be a finite dimensional vector space of continuous func-
tions defined on ∆ =
∏
n∈N ∆(In) with values in R
I =
∏
n∈N R
In. Assume
thatW contains all the constant functions. Let E be the subspace ofW×∆
such that (w, x) is in E if and only if x is a myopic equilibrium for w. Then
there exists a homeomorphism φ of W onto E whose post–composition with
the projection to W is properly homotopic to the identity.
Remark 1. A homotopy H : W × [0, 1] → W being proper means that
inft∈[0,1] ‖H(w, t)‖ → ∞ as ‖w‖ → ∞. A homeomorhism as asserted in
Theorem 1 necessarily extends to an embedding of the one–point compactifi-
cations W˜ of W into that of W ×∆, whose composition with the projection
to W˜ is homotopic to the identity mapping of the sphere W˜ .
In the proof of this and the next theorem we’ll use a property of a standard
retraction of an euclidean space RJ onto the probability simplex ∆(J).
Lemma 1. Let J be a finite set. Then, there exists a continuous function
rJ : R
J → ∆(J) such that, given x ∈ ∆(J) and y ∈ RJ , condition rJ(x+y) =
x holds true if and only if yi = maxj∈J yj for all i ∈ J satisfying xi 6= 0.
Proof: For each non-empty I ⊂ J we consider ∆(I) as a face of ∆(J) and
define YI = {y ∈ R
J : yi = maxj∈J yj if i ∈ I}. Observe that the sets
ZI = ∆(I) + YI form a closed cover of R
J . Since for any z ∈ ZI there are
unique x ∈ ∆(I) and y ∈ YI such that z = x+y, we can define the projection
πI : ZI → ∆(I) by πI(x + y) = x, where x ∈ ∆(I) and y ∈ YI . Note that
for any two non-empty subset I and I ′ of J , πI and πI′ coincide on ZI ∩ZI′ .
One can check that the map rJ : R
J → ∆(J) defined by the projections πI
satisfies the assertion of the lemma. ✷
Remark 2. It can be shown that rJ is the nearest–point retraction with
respect to the euclidean norm. (We don’t use this here.)
Proof of Theorem 1: Let r :=
∏
n∈N rn : R
I → ∆, where each rn (n ∈ N) is
the corresponding mapping of RIn onto ∆(In) given by Lemma 1 for J = In.
We divide the proof into 4 steps.
a) As an immediate consequence of the definition of myopic equilibria it
follows that a point x ∈ ∆ is a myopic equilibrium for a function w : ∆→ RI
if and only if r(w(x) + x) = x, i.e., iff r((w + x)(x)) = x.
b) By a), (w′, x) 7→ (w′−x, x) is a homeomorphism of E ′ := {(w′, x) | w′ ∈
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W and r(w′(x)) = x} onto E, and as a map into W × ∆ it is properly
homotopic to the identity on E ′ via the homotopy ((w, x), t) 7→ (w − tx, x).
It hence remains to construct a homeomorphism φ′ :W → E ′ satisfying the
claim of the Theorem with E and φ replaced by E ′ and φ′, respectively. 1
c) We now fix x0 ∈ ∆ and define maps φ
′ :W →W×∆ and ψ′ : E ′ →W
by the formulas (the composition signs are to be omitted):
φ′(w) = (w + w(x0)− wrw(x0), rw(x0)) , (1)
ψ′(w, x) = w − w(x0) + w(x) . (2)
A direct verification shows that φ′(W) ⊆ E ′ and ψ′φ′ and φ′ψ′ are identities
on W and on E ′, respectively. Hence, φ′ is a homomorphism of W onto E ′.
d) The composition of φ′ with the projection toW is given by the formula
w 7→ w + w(x0) − wrw(x0), and we define a homotopy H joining it to the
identity by the formula H(w, t) = w + t(w(x0) − wrw(x0)). To show that
H is proper let us equip W with the norm ‖w‖sup := supx∈∆ ‖w(x)‖ induced
by a norm ‖ ‖ on RI . Suppose, a contrario, that there exist wk ∈ W and
tk ∈ [0, 1] (k ∈ N) such that ‖wk‖sup →∞ and supk ‖H(wk, tk)‖sup <∞. On
dividing the latter by ‖wk‖sup and letting uk := wk/‖wk‖sup we infer that
uk + tk (uk(x0)− ukrwk(x0))→ 0 as k →∞.
By compactness of {w | ‖w‖ = 1} × [0, 1] × ∆, the sequence of triples
(uk, tk, rwk(x0)) has a cluster point, say (u0, t0, y0). Hence we get
u0 + t0 (u0(x0)− u0(y0)) = 0.
The second summand above being a constant function it follows that so is u0.
Thus u0(x0) − u0(y0) = 0 and next u0 = 0. However, u0 is a cluster point
of the sequence of norm 1 vectors uk, and this contradiction establishes the
properness of H and completes the proof. ✷
Remark 3. The homeomorphism φ : W → E constructed above has
additionally the property that for every w ∈ W the W–component of φ(w)
differs from w by a constant function (i.e., a vector of RI) whose norm is
bounded by 2‖w‖sup + δ, where δ = supx∈∆ ‖x‖. Also, ‖φ
−1(w, x) − w‖ ≤
2‖w‖sup + δ for (w, x) ∈ E.
1It is worth remarking that if it were the case that each w ∈ W was constant, as in
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), then one could finish this proof by letting φ′(w) = (w, r(w)).
7
We also have a version of Nash’s Equilibrium Existence Theorem. It is
convenient to formulate it with an expanded definition of myopic equilibria
in mind, when on ∆ one has a multi–functionW (rather than a single–valued
function w).
Definition. Let to each x ∈ ∆ be assigned a set W (x) ⊂ RI :=
∏
n∈N R
In .
i) We say that x ∈ ∆ is a myopic equilibrium for the multifunction
W : ∆→ RI if there exists a point y ∈ W (x) such that whenever n ∈ N and
i ∈ In satisfy x
n
i 6= 0, then yi = maxj∈In yj.
ii) If each set W (x) is of a product form W (x) =
∏
n∈N
∏
i∈In
W ni (x),
where W ni (x) ⊂ R, then in place of ”for the multifunction W ” we also say
above ”for the family of multifunctions (W ni )n∈N,i∈In ”.
Theorem 2. Let W be a multifunction on ∆ which takes values in non-
empty, closed, convex subsets of RI and is upper–semicontinuous (meaning
that {x ∈ ∆ | W (x) ∩K 6= ∅} is closed in ∆ whenever K is closed in RI).
Then, there exists a myopic equilibrium for W .
Proof: If W is single–valued and continuous, denoted now by w, then by
Brouwer’s Theorem the mapping ∆ ∋ x 7→ r(w(x) + x) ∈ ∆ has a fixed
point x0. (Here, r is that from the proof of Theorem 1.) By part a) of that
proof, x0 is an equilibrium for w.
In the general case we put a norm ‖ ‖ on RI . For each positive integer k
there exists a single-valued continuous function wk : ∆→ R
I such that given
x ∈ ∆ we have ‖y−wk(x
′)‖+‖x−x′‖ < 1
k
for some x′ ∈ ∆ and y ∈ W (x). By
the special case above, for each k there exists a myopic equilibrium xk ∈ ∆
for the function wk. Then, an accumulation point of the set {xk}
∞
k=1 ⊂ ∆ is
a myopic equlibrium for W . ✷
3 Game Trees and Incomplete Information
We have to modify the concept of a finite game tree (Kuhn (1953), cf. Hart
(1985)) so that the end points of the game are states for a continuation pro-
cess, be it a follow-up game or something else. We call this modification a
truncated game tree. It involves removing the final payoff from what con-
ventionally is defined to be a game tree. The term is justified because any
shorter truncation of a truncated game tree is also a truncated game tree.
With our application, instead of a payoff determined by the end point there
is a continuation payoff determined by the induced conditional probability
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distribution on the end points known in common, (which could be interpreted
as a kind of subgame). But these continuation payoffs and their relationship
to the conditional probabilities are exogenous to the truncated game tree.
The main inspiration is any game for which all players observe all actions
taken, however they don’t observe the decision process behind those actions.
The distinction can be strong with games of incomplete information, where
a player can posses a secret and makes its behaviour dependent on that
secret. As with poker, though one observes completely the behaviour of
other players, it is the relationship between their private knowledge and their
behaviour that one needs to understand as a player.
A game tree has vertices V and directed edges or arrows between the vertices.
Its vertices V can be broken down into two types, nodes and end points. E is
the set of end points and every path of arrows starts at the root and ends at
an end point, with each end point determining a unique such path of arrows.
The set D of nodes is the subset V \E and these are the vertices (except for
the root r) to which comes exactly one arrow and from which, without loss
of generality, come at least two distinct arrows.
For each player n ∈ N there is a subset Dn ⊆ D such that ∀i 6= n Di∩Dn = ∅.
Define D0 to be the set D\(∪n∈NDn). To every player n ∈ N there is a
partition Pn of the set Dn.
For every W ∈ Pn with W ⊆ D there is a corresponding set of actions A
n
W
such that there is a bijective relationship between AnW and the arrows leaving
every v ∈ W . For every v ∈ D0 there is a probability distribution pv on the
arrows leaving the node v, and therefore also on the nodes following directly
after v in the tree.
At any node v ∈ W ∈ Pn only the player n is making any decision, and
this decision determines completely which vertex follows v. At the nodes v
in D0 nature is making a decision, according to pv, concerning which vertex
follows v. If the game is at the node v ∈ Dn and v ∈ W ∈ Pn then Player n
is informed that the node is in the set W and that player has no additional
information, so that inside W player n cannot distinguish between nodes
within W .
Notice that any simultaneous move game can be so modeled, by choosing
any order of players and giving all players indiscreet partitions.
With conventional game trees, we assume that once the set E of end points
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is reached that the game is over and the players learn the outcomes. But
a truncated game tree may be a prelude to further activity, or the payoffs
may be exogenous to the truncated game tree. We may need to define the
knowledge of the players at the set E. For each player n ∈ N let Qn be a
partition on E. Let Q := ∧n∈NQn be the join partition on E, meaning the
finest partition such that for every n ∈ N every member of Qn is contained in
some member of Q. The partition Q corresponds to the concept of common
knowledge, meaning that a member C ∈ Q is what the players know in
common whenever e ∈ C is the resulting end point. If there is a continuation
game, the corresponding set C ∈ Q defines the appropriate subgame.
Definition: The truncated game tree has perfect recall for a player n if all
paths leading to a partition member in either Pn or Qn pass through the
same previous partition sets in Pn in the same order and without repetition.
Though much is stated and proven without the assumption of perfect recall,
it would be difficult to understand the relevance of most of what follows
without the assumption of perfect recall.
For every player n ∈ N let Sn be the finite set of pure decision strategies of
the players in the truncated game tree, by which we mean a function that
decides, at every set W in Pn, deterministically which member of A
n
W should
be chosen. If each such AnW has cardinality l and there are k such sets then
the cardinality of Sn is l
k.
Now we define a new payoff structure from the truncated game tree and
continuation payoffs. For any C ∈ Q let there be a correspondence FC ⊆
∆(C) × RC×N of continuation payoffs and for every n ∈ N and e ∈ E let
ge,n : R→ R be a function. 2
For every x = (xn)n∈N ∈ ∆ :=
∏
n∈N ∆(Sn), by px we denote the probability
distribution on E defined by x, and for C ∈ Q with px(C) > 0 by Px( · |C)
the conditional probability on C induced x. For s ∈ Sn, by x
s we denote the
element of ∆ obtained from x by replacing xn by s.
2The application in §4 will be ge,n(t) = λrne + (1 − λ)t for some 0 < λ < 1 where
re ∈ RN is a payoff vector associated with the end point e. If the multifunctions FC were
constant, that is FC(p) = FC(p
′) for p, p′ ∈ ∆(C), the payoff structure we define would
not be different from that of a conventional game tree.
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We say that a vector (yns )n∈N,s∈Sn is proper for x ∈ ∆ if
yns =
∑
e∈E
pxs(e)g
e,n(νe,n), n ∈ N, s ∈ Sn ,
for some ν = (νe,n)e∈E,n∈N ∈ R
E×N such that for each C ∈ Q, the image of ν
under the natural projection to RC×N belongs to FC(Px( · |C)) if px(C) > 0
or else, if px(C) = 0, belongs to some FC(q) for some q ∈ ∆(C) as determined
in some way by x.
The term ”proper values” refers to the fact that the continuation payoff
corresponds to the conditional probability distribution, given that it is well
defined. When the conditional probability is not well defined, meaning that
a set C ∈ Q has reached that shouldn’t have been reached according to x,
the continuation payoff corresponds to some distribution on C. That zero
probability of reaching C according to x implies that somebody has acted
in an inappropriate way and the use of such a continuation payoff could be
interpreted as punishment. However there are problems with seeing such a
continuation payoff as the punishment of some particular player, and this is
discussed below.
Theorem 3. Let FC : ∆(C) → R
C×N , C ∈ Q, be upper semi-continuous
correspondences with non-empty convex values, and ge,n : R → R, (e, n) ∈
E×N , continuous increasing functions. Then there exist x ∈ ∆ and a vector
(yns )n∈N,s∈Sn proper for x and such that y
n
s ≥ y
n
t for all n ∈ N and all s, t ∈ Sn
with xns > 0.
Proof: Let ǫ > 0 be given and let B be a positive quantity larger than any
payoff from the correspondences FC . For each C ∈ Q there is a function
φC,ǫ : ∆(C)→ R
C×N that is a continuous ǫ approximation of FC . If px(C) ≥
ǫ then define λx,ǫ(C) = 1, and define λx,ǫ(C) =
px(C)
ǫ
if px(C) ≤ ǫ.
For every x ∈ ∆, n ∈ N and e ∈ E let
f˜ e,nǫ (x) = g
e,n
(
λx,ǫ(C)φ
e,n
C,ǫ(Px( · |C)) + (1− λx,ǫ(C))2B
)
,
where C contains e and φe,nC,ǫ is the (e, n)-th coordinate of φC,ǫ. If px(C) = 0
then f˜ e,nǫ (x) = g
e,n(2B). For each s ∈ Sn, we let
f˜ns,ǫ(x) =
∑
e∈E
pxs(e)f˜
e,n
ǫ (x) .
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Notice that the f˜ns,ǫ(x) are continuous in x. By Theorem 2, for each ǫ > 0
there exist a myopic equilibrium, say x(ǫ), for the family (f˜ns,ǫ)n∈N,s∈Sn. Thus
f˜ns,ǫ(x(ǫ)) ≥ f˜
n
t,ǫ(x(ǫ)) for s, t ∈ Sn with x(ǫ)
n
s > 0 .
Observe that for some sequence (ǫk)k∈N converging to 0 we have:
(a) the sequence
(
x(ǫk)
)
k∈N
converges to some x˜ ∈ ∆,
(b) for each n ∈ N and s ∈ Sn, the sequence
(
f˜ns,ǫk(x(ǫk))
)
k∈N
converges
to some y˜ns ,
(c) for each e ∈ E and n ∈ N , the sequence
(
ν˜e,nǫk
)
k∈N
, where
ν˜e,nǫk = λx(ǫk),ǫk(C)φ
e,n
C,ǫk
(Px(ǫk)( · |C)) + (1− λx(ǫk),ǫk(C))2B ,
converges to some ν˜e,n.
Note that for all n ∈ N and s ∈ Sn we have
y˜ns =
∑
e∈E
px˜s(e)g
e,n(ν˜e,n) .
Observe that if x˜ns > 0, where s ∈ Sn, then x(ǫk)
n
s > 0 for almost all k. It
follows that
y˜ns ≥ y˜
n
t for s, t ∈ Sn with x˜
n
s > 0 .
Note also that the sequence
(
px(ǫk)(C)
)
k∈N
converges to px˜(C).
Suppose that px˜(C) > 0. Then px(ǫk)(C) > ǫk for all sufficiently large
k’s. For such k’s we have ν˜e,nǫk = φ
e,n
C,ǫk
(Px(ǫk)( · |C)) for all (e, n) ∈ C × N .
Thus by (c), the sequence
(
ν˜C,ǫk
)
k∈N
, where ν˜C,ǫk =
(
ν˜e,nǫk
)
e∈C,n∈N
, converges
to ν˜C ∈ FC(Px˜( · |C)).
Now, suppose px˜(C) = 0. If for almost all k, px(ǫk)(C) = 0, we choose an
arbitrary νC in FC(∆(C)). Otherwise, as νC we choose any cluster point of
the set {φC,ǫk(Px(ǫk)( · |C) | px(ǫk)(C) > 0}, which is also in FC(∆(C)).
Now, let ν = (νe,n)e∈E,n∈N ∈ R
E×N be such that the projection of ν
onto RC×N is the vector ν˜C if px˜(C) > 0 and the defined above vector νC if
px˜(C) = 0. For n ∈ N and s ∈ Sn, we define
yns =
∑
e∈E
px˜s(e)g
e,n(νe,n), .
Note that by the definition the vector (yns )n∈N,s∈Sn is proper for x˜.
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Since νe,n ≤ ν˜e,n for all e ∈ E and n ∈ N , it follows that yns ≤ y˜
n
s for
all n ∈ N and s ∈ Sn. Now, for any x ∈ ∆, if x
n
s > 0 for some s ∈ Sn and
px(C) = 0 then pxs(C) = 0. It follows that if x˜
n
s > 0 for some s ∈ Sn then
yns = y˜
n
s . Consequently, for s, t ∈ Sn with x˜
n
s > 0, we have y
n
s = y˜
n
s ≥ y˜
n
t ≥ y
n
t ,
which completes the proof. ✷
Remarks: a) The proof of the above theorem has a resemblance to “trem-
bling hand” arguments in Selten (1975), however the mechanism for giving
small probabilities to potentially undesirable actions is very different.
b) What the players observe in common is some set C in Q. Given
that they know each other’s strategies, the choice of x in ∆, they know in
common a conditional probability distribution on elements contained in the
set C in Q. This doesn’t mean that each player knows only this about the
payoffs, either his or her payoff or those of others. A player may learn much
more, including potentially exactly which e ∈ C will be reached for any given
C ∈ Q. In such an event the player evaluates his or her actions according
to that exact knowledge of the end point e, however knowing also that the
payoff at e is determined by the induced common knowledge distribution on
C. There is a similarity with poker, in which a player may know that he
or she has the winning hand, but that player’s betting strategy reflects an
understanding of what all players believe.
c) It would be tempting to define the continuation payoffs from the FC
always as those from a game, that is payoffs generated by strategies. However
we would then require for all e ∈ C ∈ Q some determination of a payoff for
each player n ∈ N , including the case of someW ∈ Qn given zero probability
by the relevant strategy x. There is a problem with defining a player whose
presence in the game has zero probability and yet receives a payoff that could
potentially torpedo the equilibrium property. On the other hand, we did
need to define such payoffs, as we had to consider the payoff consequences of
decision functions chosen with zero probability according to x and make sure
that they did not profit the player in question over those decision functions
given positive probability.
d) Also tempting would be to interpret the landing at a C ∈ Q that is
given zero probability by the x ∈ ∆ as the trigger of some punishment of a
player. With two-player games, if only one player had deviated, indeed that
player can be held responsible for bringing the play to the set C. But with
three or more players, it may be impossible to obtain common knowledge
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of which player had brought the game to this forbidden subset. Imagine
the following example; there are three players i = 1, 2, 3 and each player
has three strategies, left, right, and centre, and each player is required to
play only centre. If all three players choose centre, then all three players
are informed of this fact. If Player i chooses left then Player i − 1 (modulo
3) is informed of this fact and if Player i chooses right then Player i + 1 is
informed of this fact; and in either case if Player i was the only disobedient
player, the only information that the third other player receives is that not
all three players had chosen centre. Lets assume that Player 1 discovers that
one of the other players was disobedient, but not which one. There are two
possibilities, either Player 2 played right or Player 3 played left. Players 2
and 3 could both maintain that they were not disobedient. The effective
punishment of Player 3 may be very beneficial to Player 2 which could place
an otherwise sound equilibrium in doubt, as then Player 2 could deviate
and then claim that it was Player 3 who deviated. With two players, this
problem doesn’t appear, because the two could punish each other. With the
above theorem, there is an implicit punishment through the choice of some
continuation payoff for all the players, but no explicit punishment strategies,
which may prove problematic.
e) We could have stated the theorem so that the multifunction of payoffs
applies only to all distributions that can be generated by strategies, but
it would have made no difference. This is because the set of distributions
generated by strategies is closed, and an upper-semi-continuous multifunction
with values as described and defined on a closed subset of distributions can
be extended to an analogous multifunction defined on all distributions.
4 Games of Incomplete Information on One
Side
We return to Neyman’s question. There is a finite set K of states of nature.
Nature chooses a state k ∈ K according to a commonly known probability
on K, and Player One, but not Player Two, is informed of nature’s choice.
The finite sets of moves for the players are the same for all states, the set I
for Player One and the set J for Player Two. After each stage of play, both
players are informed of each others’ moves. The play is repeated indefinitely,
and the chosen state remains constant throughout play.
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For every state k ∈ K let Ak and Bk be the payoff matrices of the two players
with I indexing the rows and J indexing the columns. The entries aki,j and
bki,j in A
k and Bk are the payoffs to the first and second players respectively.
given that the state is k, the move of Player One is i, and the move of Player
Two is j.
The strategies of the game are the same as those described in Simon, Spiez˙,
and Torun´czyk (1995) and Aumann and Maschler (1995), though the payoffs
are defined differently. For the sake of completeness, we describe the strategy
and payoff structures below.
A behaviour strategy of Player One is an infinite sequence α = (α1, α2, . . . )
such that for each l αl is a mapping from K × (I × J)l−1 to ∆(I).
A behaviour strategy of Player Two is an infinite sequence β = (β1, β2, . . . )
such that for each l βl is a mapping from (I × J)l−1 to ∆(I).
Let I and J be the set of behaviour strategies of Players One and Two,
respectively. Define the set of finite play-histories of length l to be Hl :=
K × (I × J)l, and define Hkl to be the subset {k} × (I × J)
l.
For any fixed k ∈ K, every pair of behaviour strategies α ∈ I and β ∈ J
induces a probability measure µl,kα,β on H
k
l , and with the initial probability p0
such a pair induces a probability measure µlα,β on Hl.
To define the payoffs, for both players i = 1, 2 there is a finite sequence
λi1, λ
i
2, . . . , λ
i
n of non-negative real numbers such that λ
i = λi1 + · · ·+ λ
i
n and
0 ≤ λi ≤ 1. For every h ∈ Hn with h = (k, i1, j1, . . . , in, jn) define f
1
n(h)
to be
∑n
l=1 λ
1
l a
k
il,jl
and f 2n(h) to be
∑n
l=1 λ
2
l b
k
il,jl
. For every h ∈ Hm with
h = (k, i1, j1, . . . , im, jm) define f˜
1
m(h) to be
1
m
∑m
l=1 a
k
il,jl
and f˜ 2m(h) to be
1
m
∑m
l=1 b
k
il,jl
.
An equilibrium is a pair of behaviour strategies α ∈ I and β ∈ J such that
for every k ∈ K
ak =
∫
Hkn
f 1n(h)dµ
n,k
α,β + (1− λ
1) lim
m→∞
∫
Hkm
f˜ 1m(h)dµ
m,k
α,β
and
bk =
∫
Hkn
f 2n(h)dµ
n,k
α,β + (1− λ
2) lim
m→∞
∫
Hkm
f˜ 2m(h)dµ
m,k
α,β
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exist and for every pair α∗ ∈ I and β∗ ∈ J∫
Hn
f 1n(h)dµ
n
α∗,β + (1− λ
1) lim
m→∞
sup
∫
Hm
f˜ 1m(h)dµ
m
α∗,β ≤
∑
k
pk0a
k and
∫
Hn
f 2n(h)dµ
n
α,β + (1− λ
2) lim
m→∞
sup
∫
Hm
f˜ 2m(h)dµ
m
α,β∗ ≤
∑
k
pk0b
k.
Such games as described above we call Neyman games, to distinguish them
from the conventional infinitely repeated games of incomplete information
on one side, introduced in Aumann and Maschler (1995). If λi = 0 for
both i = 1, 2 then the game is the one described there and the above is the
definition of an equilibrium of such a game.
Notice the asymmetry in the behaviour strategies used to define equilibria.
Player One’s strategy uses knowledge of the state of nature, so the max-
imisation, relative to a fixed strategy of Player Two, can be performed on
each state independently. Player Two’s knowledge of the state of nature
comes only from a calculations of Bayesian conditional probabilities accord-
ing Player One’s chosen strategy and the actions taken.
With regard to the infinitely repeated game in Aumann and Maschler (1995),
these authors with the help of R. Stearns introduced a solution concept known
as a joint plan. For any p ∈ ∆(K) define a∗(p) to be the value of the
zero-sum game defined by the matrix A(p) :=
∑
k∈K p
kAk, where pk is the
probability that p gives to the state k ∈ K. Likewise define b∗(p) to be
the value of the zero-sum defined by the matrix B(p) :=
∑
k∈K p
kBk. A
vector x ∈ RK is individually rational for Player One if x · q ≥ a∗(q) for
all q ∈ ∆(K). A pair (r, p) ∈ R × ∆(K) is individually rational for Player
Two if r ≥ vex(b∗)(p), where vex(b∗) is the unique convex function satisfying
vex(b∗) ≤ b∗ and vex(b∗) ≥ f for all convex functions f such that f ≤ b∗.
For every γ ∈ ∆(I × J) define γA ∈ RK by
(γA)k :=
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
γ(i,j)Ak(i, j)
and define γB likewise. A joint plan for an initial probability p0 is
(1) a finite subset of probabilities V ⊆ ∆(K) such that the convex hull of V
contains the initial probability p0,
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(2) for every v ∈ V a γv ∈ ∆(I × J),
(3) for some finite n a finite set T ⊂ In of signals in bijective relation to the
set V and a state dependent choice of an s ∈ T performed by Player One
such that the signal s ∈ T implies by Bayes rule a conditional probability on
the set K equal to its corresponding member in V .
(4) if the signal s chosen corresponds to v ∈ V , an agreement between the
players to play through the rest of the game a deterministic sequence of pairs
of actions ((i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . ) such that in the limit the distribution γv is
obtained, and
(5) punishment strategies of the two players to be implemented in the event
that a player does not adhere to the agreed upon sequence of actions.
Aumann and Maschler showed that a joint plan describes an equilibrium of
the undiscounted game if there is an individually rational y ∈ RK such that
for every v ∈ V the following holds:
(1) (γvB) · v ≥ vex(b
∗)(v),
(2) ∀k ∈ K (γvA)
k = yk if vk > 0,
(3) ∀k ∈ K (γvA)
k ≤ yk if vk = 0.
If necessary, Player One is punished according to a strategy of Player Two
such that simultaneously for every k ∈ K Player One is held down to no more
than yk. This ability of Player Two is based on a theorem of D. Blackwell
(1956).
The punishment of Player Two centers on the conditional probability of the
states of nature as implied by the actions taken and the chosen strategy of
Player One. There is a qualitative difference between the punishment of
the two players. The punishment of Player One is absolute with a quantity
determined for each state simultaneously. The punishment of Player Two
is relative to a conditional probability distribution on the states of nature.
The need to calculate payoffs according to expectation gives the effective
punishment.
The equilibrium payoffs of a joint plan equilibrium is the pair (x, y) ∈ RK ×
RK such that for every k ∈ K the value xk is what the first player gets in
average expectation in the limit at the state k and yk is what the second
player gets in average expectation in the limit at the state k. Notice from
the structure of a joint plan that these values are well defined.
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Hart (1985) showed that if (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ R
K ×Rk are both equilib-
rium payoffs of two distinct joint plan equlibrium corresponding to the same
initial probability distribution on the states, then for every 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 there
is an equilibrium of the game that delivers expected payoffs of λ(x1, y1)+(1−
λ)(x2, y2). The players accomplish this through a jointly controlled lottery, a
way for the players to choose one or the other joint plan equilibrium through
an initial phase of independent random behaviour. See also Aumann and
Maschler (1995) for an explanation of a jointly controlled lottery.
Now we apply Theorem 3 to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The above question of A. Neyman is answered in the affirma-
tive, meaning that every Neyman game has an equilibrium.
Proof: We have to define the truncated game tree, the mixed strategy space
∆, the partitions Qi on the end points of this tree, the continuation vectors
FC for every C ∈ Q1 ∧ Q2 = Q, the payoff functions g
e,i for the players
i = 1, 2, and also what continuation payoff is chosen when a (σ, τ) ∈ ∆
means that the corresponding C will be reached with zero probability.
The first n stages of a Neyman game define the truncated game tree Γn for
which E := K × (I × J)n are the end points. The truncated game tree
has 2n + 1 levels of play, the first level being Nature’s choice and the 2n
following levels being alternations between Player One’s and Player Two’s
choices of actions. The first to move is Nature, choosing some k ∈ K.
After Nature’s choice, Player One has a partition consisting of |K| different
singletons, representing a complete knowledge of Nature’s choice. This is
followed by an action of Player Two, for which Player Two has only one
partition member for this stage of play, meaning that Player Two has no
information on which to base his choice of action. For every m < n, at
the conclusion of the mth stage (meaning that 2m + 1 actions have been
performed, m by both Players One and Two and the first by Nature) Player
One’s partition consist of the singletons of K × (I × J)m, which are used
to determine Player One’s m + 1st action, followed by partition elements
for Player Two (to determine his m + 1st action) defined by the different
members of (I × J)m (meaning that Player Two saw the first m actions of
Player One but not the m + 1st action). The partition Q1 on E for Player
One consists of the |K| · |I|n · |J |n many singletons (meaning that at the
conclusion of the truncated game tree Player Two does learn what Player
One did in the last stage of that tree). The partition Q2 on E for the second
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player consists of the sets of size |K| of the form K×{x} for all x ∈ (I×J)n.
The partition Q = Q1 ∧ Q2 defining the common knowledge is the same as
Q2 the partition corresponding to the second player. There is a one-to-one
correspondence between every C ∈ Q and every sequence (i1, j2, . . . , in, jn)
of moves by both players.
Let S1 and S2 be the set of pure decision functions of Player One and Player
Two respectively. The space of mixed strategies of the truncated game tree
is ∆ := ∆(S1)×∆(S2). Likewise a pair of behaviour strategies for the whole
game is equivalent to a point in ∆ followed by a collection behaviour strate-
gies for the stages after the nth stage. Every choice of (σ, τ) ∈ ∆ combined
with a sequence i1, j1, . . . , il, jl of actions taken with positive probability in-
duces through the Bayes rule a conditional probability on C. As stated above,
the sequence i1, j1, . . . , il, jl defines uniquely a member C in Q and Pσ,τ ( · |C)
is that conditional probability, whereby it does not matter whether we see
this as a distribution on the set C = {(k, i1, j1, . . . , in, jn) | k ∈ K} or on the
set K itself.
Notice that for e = (k, i1, j1, . . . , in, jn), the probability Pσ,τ (e) is the product
of the pobability of the choice of k ∈ K, the corresponding probabilities of
actions of Player One induced by σ and the corresponding probabilities of
actions of Player Two induced by τ . Since the probabilities of actions of
Player Two induced by τ do not depend on k ∈ K we obtain that
(∗) If for σ ∈ ∆(S1) and τ, τ
′ ∈ ∆(S2) and some C ∈ Q both Pσ,τ (C)
and Pσ,τ ′(C) are non-zero then the conditional probabilities Pσ,τ ( · |C) and
Pσ,τ ′( · |C) are equal.
We define FC : ∆(C) → R
C×{1,2} such that for every p ∈ ∆(C) the set
FC(p) is the convexification of the joint plan equilibria corresponding to the
initial probability distribution ∆(C). For every e ∈ E, which corresponds
to a history h = (k, i1, i2, . . . , in, jn) ∈ Hn, also a member of some C ∈ Q,
and some continuation vector v ∈ RC×{1,2}, define the payoff ge,i(ve,i) to be
f i(h) + (1− λi)ve,i.
Now consider the case of (σ, τ) such that the conditional probability on some
C is ill defined. If there is no τ such that with (σ, τ ) the set C is reached
with positive probability, then a continuation payoff can be chosen arbitrarily
in FC(q) for any q. If there is some τ such that the set C is reached with
positive probability with (σ, τ), let the continuation payoff be any in FC(q)
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for q being the conditional probability defined by (σ, τ ). Notice that, by (∗),
all such τ define the same conditional probability.
To apply Theorem 3, we need to know that FC so defined is u.s.c., non-
empty, and convex valued. With regard to the conventional infinitely re-
peated undiscounted games, by Simon, Spiez˙, and Torun´czyk (1995) joint
plan equilibria exist for every probability in the probability simplex ∆(K)
and the equality and inequality conditions defining them imply that they
are upper-semi-continuous as a correspondence (indeed satisfying the more
general condition of “spanning”, Simon, Spiez˙, and Torun´czyk (2002)). It
follows from Hart (1985) that equilibrium payoffs are generated by convexi-
fying the payoffs from joint plan equilibria corresponding to any fixed prob-
ability p ∈ ∆(K). As the vector space of payoffs is finite dimensional, the
point-wise convexification of an upper-semi-continuous correspondence is also
upper-semi-continuous.
From Kuhn’s Theorem (1953) we can equivalently consider mixed strate-
gies for the first n stages combined with behaviour strategies for the fol-
lowing stages. From Theorem 3, there are mixed strategies σ and τ in
∆ = ∆(S1) × ∆(S2) on the first n stages that satisfy the results of The-
orem 3. We combine the σ and τ with behaviour strategies for the remaining
stages that correspond, for each C ∈ Q, to the equilibrium payoffs in FC(p)
obtained from Theorem 3.
In the definition of σ and τ , as long as the set C ∈ Q should be reached
with positive probability by these strategies, neither player cannot detect
deviation by the other player. Furthermore no action of either player in the
first n stages can change the conditional probability on any C ∈ Q. This is
because the actions taken by both players define the C ∈ Q and the only way
to update the conditional probabilities is through observation of the played
actions. Changing strategies can only result in a change in the distribution
on the C ∈ Q reached, but not the conditional probability associated with
any fixed C ∈ Q.
We consider first what happens at the stages beyond the nth, and consider
first the payoff of Player Two. Because of the way the continuation payoff
was defined in all cases and because the first player is adhering to its pre-
scribed strategy, it does not matter whether or not the C ∈ Q is reached with
positive probability, the q used to define the continuation payoff in FC(q) is
the conditional probability on the states as defined by the first n stages of
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play. As his prescribed behaviour after the nth stage is an equilibrium of the
the undiscounted Aumann-Maschler game whose distribution on the states
of nature is that conditional probability q, there is no advantage for devia-
tion. As for Player One, it doesn’t matter which state is chosen and what
is the corresponding conditional probability q on the states (as understood
by Player Two), Player One gets the corresponding continuation payoff with
the prescribed behaviour strategy and according to Blackwell (1956) cannot
obtain a better payoff no matter which state was chosen.
The equalities and inequalities defining the myopic equilibrium, combined
with the lack of incentive to deviate after the first n stages, removes any
incentive for either player to deviate in the first n stages. ✷
Dropping the condition of perfect monitoring, we suspect that a proof of
equilibrium existence is straightforward as long as Player One has the abil-
ity to send distinct non-revealing signals, the same sufficient condition for
equilibria described in Simon, Spiez˙, and Torun´czyk (2002).
For the application of Theorem 3, it is not necessary that the payoffs from
the initial n stages are related in any way to the payoffs from the following
undiscounted game. The only relevance of the first n stages to the following
stages is the induced probability distribution on the states K. We could
therefore introduce two sets of payoffs, one for a discounted game with infinite
sequences λi1, λ
i
2, . . . for both players i = 1, 2 and another set of payoffs
for an undiscounted game. Arbitrary pairs of payoffs so combined together
would allow for ǫ-equilibria for every ǫ > 0 (by defining the truncated game
tree from arbitrarily many initial stages). But what of 0-equilibria? The
obtaining of good payoffs in one of the two games, either the undiscounted
or discounted, would be a distraction for obtaining good payoffs in the other
game. Even when the payoff matrices for the undiscounted and discounted
evaluates are the same (as with the Neyman games), the performing of joint
lotteries to convexify the payoffs would be a distraction from the process
of playing the discounted game. Therefore to demonstrate an equilibrium
here would require an extension of Theorem 2 to the “spanning property” of
Simon, Spiez˙, and Torun´czyk (2002) rather than the much simpler property of
convex valued. Nevertheless one would have to show also that the equilibrium
behaviour of the players from an infinite sequence of game tree truncations
would be appropriate for the undiscounted game. At present we do not know
if it is possible to obtain such an extension of equilibrium existence to the
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Neyman games where there is infinite discounting.
Though the theorem can deliver powerful results concerning the equilibria
of composite games, one does have to be careful that the given continua-
tion payoffs are supported by equilibria of the continuation game. Infinitely
repeated games of incomplete information can lack equilibria if one gives to
Player Two some very slight information that Player One does not have; such
are games of “incomplete information on one and a half sides” in Sorin and
Zamir (1985). Exactly this problem arises because the continuation payoffs
of the theorem are determined by a distribution on the set C that is common
knowledge, and yet a player may know more than this and choose not to
accept any payoff scheme determined by such common knowledge. In the
application to Neyman’s question, this problem was avoided by an estab-
lished theory concerning the equilibria of games with incomplete information
on one side. Indeed even with imperfect monitoring over a finite set of stages,
there may be problems with the “individual rationality” condition necessary
for an equilibrium in some contexts (Stapenhorst (2016)). The desire not
to let such difficulties detract from the power of the theorem was further-
more a reason for formulating the theorem without there being necessarily a
continuation game.
5 Other examples and an application
Although it was developed for understanding the Nash equilibria of infinitely
repeated games, the concept of a myopic equilibrium is independent of these
games.
Look at the following simple example, based on the 2 × 2 matrix A =(
1 −1
−1 1
)
and representing the conventional zero-sum matching pennies
game with two players and two actions. From this simple game create a
non-zero-sum game in the following way. If (p, 1 − p) is the mixed strategy
of Player One and (q, 1 − q) is the mixed strategy of Player Two (proba-
bilistic choices for the two pure actions), let the payoff of Player One be
(p, 1 − p)A(q, 1 − q)t + max(p, 1 − p) and let the payoff of Player Two be
−(p, 1 − p)A(q, 1 − q)t + max(q, 1 − q). It is easy to see that there would
be no Nash equilibrium in the usual sense of best replies, as in response to
any mixed strategy of the other player a payoff of 1 could be obtained by
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choosing with certainty one or the other action, and yet a payoff of 1 could
not be obtained by both players simultaneously (as the sum of their payoffs
being at least 2 is possible only if both chose some action with certainty and
then one of the players would have a payoff of no more than 0). One can also
show that this game does not have local equilibria as described above.
Now define the payoff from an action i = 1, 2 of Player One as eiA(q, 1 −
q)t+max(p, 1−p), where e1 = (1, 0) and e2 = (0, 1). Do the same for Player
Two: his payoff is −(p, 1 − p)Aeti + max(q, 1 − q). Given that both p and q
are fixed at 1
2
, both actions of both players yield the same expected payoff
of 1
2
, meaning that a myopic equilibrium is defined. One could interpret the
(1
2
, 1
2
) distribution as the accidental result of a flip of the coin that does not
change the probability by which that choice is made.
To demonstrate further the fundamental difference in equilibrium concepts,
look at the following one-person optimisation example where there is both
a Nash equilibrium and a myopic equilibrium, but they are very different.
Our single player Piers wants to vote for Donald Trump, but is deeply em-
barrassed by the desire to do so. Behaviour in the voting booth is secret,
however the voting intention of Piers before entering the voting booth is not
secret (at least from his wife and closest friends) and this influences the util-
ity of his behaviour. Let us assume that p is the probability that Piers will
vote for Trump and that Piers loses 5p in utility through that voting inten-
tion, regardless of what he actually does. All things being equal, regardless
of the value of p, in the voting booth there is an advantage of 1 to vote
for Trump over Clinton. Without loss of generality, lets assume that once
in the voting booth the utility of voting for Trump and Clinton is 1 − 5p
and −5p respectively. Regardless of the probability p, voting for Trump is
always preferable to voting for Clinton, which makes for one unique myopic
equilibrium, namely a certain vote for Trump (p = 1). Define the payoff
function on the probability simplex in the way outlined above – as a function
of p, the expected utility to Piers would be p(1 − p) + (1 − p)(−5p) = −4p.
The unique optimal payoff as a function of p would be 0 obtained at p = 0,
meaning a certain vote for Clinton (and this defines the unique Nash equilib-
rium). However the certain vote for Trump, the unique myopic equilibrium,
results in an expected payoff of −4. We see from this example that a myopic
equilibrium of a one-player game is not necessarily a local maximum.
The distinction between myopic equilibria and Nash equilibria for one player
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games can exist when neither occur at the boundary of the probability sim-
plex. Now we assume, for whatever reason, that the embarrassment of want-
ing to vote for Trump disappears when one actually votes for Clinton. Fol-
lowing this idea, the utility for voting for Trump and Clinton could be 1−5p
and 0, respectively. As a problem of optimisation, the expected utility of
the distribution (p, 1− p) is (1− 5p)p = p− 5p2, a strictly concave function
with a unique maximal solution. By taking the derivative and setting it to
zero, one discovers that the value is maximised at p = 1
10
(the unique myopic
maximum and Nash equilibrium) for the value of 1
20
. However the unique
myopic equilibrium is obtained at p = 1
5
, where both the utility of voting for
Clinton and voting for Trump are equal and are equal to 0.
We believe the most relevant application of myopic equilibria will be toward
a new and more liberal understanding of what is a subgame in a game tree.
Conventionally, the concept of a subgame is very restrictive; it is a node
where upon being reached all players know that this node and only this node
has been reached. It is common for students to identity subgames erroneously
because of this restrictive definition. With the concept of myopic equilibria,
for a subset of nodes intermediate to the flow of the game we can perceive
a family of subgames as distributions on this set, determined by the mixed
strategies of players who had acted previously. From Theorem 1 we know
that the equilibrium correspondence as a function of these distributions has
a topological structure implying the spanning property of Simon, Spiez˙, and
Torun´czyk (2002). This orientation would be empowered by a generalisa-
tion of Theorem 2 employing the spanning property, both in the resulting
structure of myopic equilibrium solutions and in the input correspondence of
payoffs.
6 References
Aumann, R. and Maschler, M. (1995), Repeated Games with Incomplete
Information. With the collaboration of R. Stearns. Cambridge, MA:
M.I.T. Press.
Biasi, C. and Monis, T. (2013), Weak Local Nash Equilibrium, Topological
Methods of Nonlinear Analysis, 41, No. 2, pp. 409-419.
24
Blackwell, D. (1956), An Analogue of the Minimax Theorem for Vector
Payoffs, Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 6, pp 1-8.
Hart, S. (1985), Non-zero Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incom-
plete Information, Mathematics of Operations Research 10, No. 1,
117-153.
Held, M., Wolfe, P., Crowder, H. (1974), Validation of subgradient optimi-
sation, Mathematical Programming 6, 62-88.
Kohlberg, E. and Mertens, J.-F. (1986), On the Strategic Stability of Equi-
libria, Econometrica, 54 (5), pp. 1003-1037.
Kuhn, H. (1953), Extensive Games and the Problem of Information, in
Contributions to the Theory of Games I, Princeton University Press,
eds. Kuhn and Tucker, pp. 193-216.
Nash, J. (1950), Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 36, pp. 48-49.
Neyman, A. (2016), private communication.
Selten, R. (1975), A Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilib-
rium Points in Extensive Games, International Journal of Game The-
ory, Vol 4, No. 1, pp 25-55.
Simon, R.S., Spiez˙, S., and Torun´czyk, H. (1995), The Existence of Equi-
libria in Certain Games, Separation for Families of Convex Functions
and a Theorem of Borsuk-Ulam Type, Israel Journal of Mathematics,
Vol 92, pp. 1-21.
Simon, R.S., Spiez˙, S., Torun´czyk, H. (2002), Equilibrium Existence and
Topology in Games of Incomplete Information on One Side, Transac-
tions of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 354, No. 12, pp.
5005-5026.
Sorin, S. and Zamir, S. (1985), A Two-Person Game with Lack of Informa-
tion on One and One-Half Sides, Mathematics of Operations Research
10, 17-23.
25
Stapenhorst, C. (2016), Noisy Signalling in the Principal-Agent Problem,
M. Sc. Dissertation, Mathematics, L.S.E.
26
